If you think it doesn't, have a look at the DWP research paper The Attitude to Age in Britain 2010/11 (http://research.dwp.gov.uk). Here are some of its findings based on surveys conducted in 2010/11:

• The mean age at which people stop being young is 41.  

• The mean age at which people start to be described as old is 59.   

• One-fifth of respondents thought age discrimination was not serious or not very serious but 36% said that it was very serious. Younger age groups thought that age discrimination was more serious than older ones.     

• More young respondents reported experiencing age discrimination than older ones?    

• Making more use of mediation and simplifying compromise agreements. .  

• People employed full-time or self-employed were less likely to have experienced discrimination than people who were unemployed or worked part-time.

• A man has an 8% lower chance of experiencing age discrimination than a woman.

• People over 70 are regarded as more friendly, more competent and having higher moral standards than people in their 20s.

• Using age to rate the status of people in their 20s, 40s and over 70s, people in their 40s scored highest.

Otherwise you could end up at the wrong end of an employment tribunal claim for unfair dismissal. This is what happened to the employer in Willoughby v CF Capital plc [2011] IRLR 935 EWCA. 

W was an account manager in sales. She had been employed by CFC for 18 years. Her manager, K, told her on 1 December 2008 that the company was in financial difficulties and one option was for staff to become self-employed and receive a retainer plus commission. W said she was interested and asked for written details. On 23 December she received a letter with an agency agreement for her signature under which she would be self-employed. The letter said this arrangement was by mutual agreement, her employment contract would terminate on 31 December 2008 and her agency agreement would start on 1 January 2009.

W took legal advice and on 5 January, when CFC opened after the Christmas break, she telephoned the MD of CFC to tell him that she did not accept the agency agreement and was treating herself as dismissed. K telephoned her twice to say there was a misunderstanding; she did not need to move to self-employment if she did not want to and could remain in employment. K wrote to her on 9 January confirming this. 

W brought claims for unfair and wrongful dismissal. CFC argued that she had resigned. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Employment Appeal Tribunal that she had not. She had been dismissed. The words of dismissal in the letter of 23 December were clear and unambiguous and K's unilateral attempt to withdraw them was ineffective.

Employers are under a duty to make reasonable adjustments to the work or working arrangements of disabled employees to help them do their jobs. 

Cordell v Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2011 IDS Brief 939 EAT is an unusual case where the cost of making the adjustment was regarded as too high to be reasonable even for a large employer. 

C was profoundly deaf. She worked for the FCO in London and then in Warsaw. At all times she had the support of a team of professional lip readers. In 2009 she was offered a posting in Astana, Kazakhstan - provided that under the FCO's reasonable adjustment policy she could be supported and what the cost would be. The FCO's draft assessment put the cost of lip reader support at £606,397 over the two year posting. C's own assessment was £460,000.

The FCO's HR director wrote to C telling her that the adjustments were not reasonable. In addition to the cost, there was also the issue about whether continuous lip reading support could be provided in Astana. She told C she could apply for other posts and her career would not be adversely affected. C's internal grievance was rejected and she brought tribunal claims for disability discrimination including for failure to make reasonable adjustments.

The employment tribunal rejected her reasonable adjustments claim and this was upheld by the EAT (Employment Appeal Tribunal). Cost was a key factor here. The tribunal was entitled to take into account that the cost of the adjustment for C amounted to five times her salary and was almost equivalent to the combined salaries of the diplomatic staff at the embassy. It would also use up a large amount of the FCO's disability budget. Although a self-imposed budget could not be decisive of what was a reasonable amount to spend, this was still a relevant consideration given that no-one's resources are infinite. The EAT pointed out that in addition to the cost, the tribunal had also taken into account the potential difficulty of finding a sufficient number of lip readers in Astana.

DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd v Doolan 2011 IDS Brief 939 EAT is a recent illustration of this important point.

D was an operations manager at DB Schenker in a safety critical role. He was off sick with depression for 6 months in 2004. This was caused by his excessive workload. In March 2007 D was promoted to production manager. This was also a safety critical role. A few months later D went sick with stress-related depression again. 

D's GP certified that he was fit to work in January 2008. D was also examined by a DWP doctor who said that his incapacity benefit should stop. P, an HR manager, obtained D's medical records and asked M, an occupational health physician whether D would be able to carry out his full duties. M did not comply with P's request to refer D to an occupational psychologist but said that in his view D was ready to return to work but it was difficult to predict whether he would fall ill again.

P then instructed an occupational psychologist, whose view was that it was unlikely that D could return to work in a demanding job without risking falling ill again. The occupational psychologist thought D was better suited to working in a structured role over which he had more control. 

D was dismissed for capability and brought an unfair dismissal claim. The tribunal upheld this holding that the employer was wrong to attach such weight to the occupational psychologist's report. He was not a doctor and his report did not indicate that D was incapable of returning to his job.

The EAT (Employment Appeal Tribunal) allowed the employer's appeal. The issue for the tribunal was whether a reasonable employer could find on the evidence it had that D was capable of returning to his post. The tribunal should also have kept in mind that the decision to dismiss was a managerial one, not a medical one even though medical reports could be of assistance in coming to their decision.

Here the tribunal should have considered (1) did the employer believe that D was not capable of performing his job (2) was this a reason formed after a reasonable investigation and (3) did the employer have reasonable grounds for its belief. The tribunal had substituted its own views for those of the employer and it was not permitted to do that. The EAT noted that the GP's certification and the DWP doctor's assessment were about general fitness for work; not about D's ability to carry out a particular role. Contrary to the tribunal's view, the employer was entitled to rely on the occupational psychologist's report and in any event this was not actually contrary to M's assessment. The case was remitted to a fresh tribunal for rehearing.

This was the employer's defence in McBride v Falkirk Football  & Athletic Club[2012] IRLR 22 EAT. 

McB was the first team coach and assistant to the coach of the reserve team of the FFA Club. The club had a youth academy and the manager of the under 19 team was its director and responsible for selecting the under 19 team. This manager was promoted to club manager. He appointed McB to be the manager and head coach of the under 19 team and told him he would be solely responsible for picking this team. 

A few months later the club appointed a director of the youth academy. After the under 19 team lost a match and a misunderstanding about the attendance of some of the under 19 players at the academy, the manager told the youth academy director that he wanted him, not McB, to pick the under 19 team and told him to tell McB which he did. There was no consultation. McB was most upset. He met the manager later that day. The manager refused to reconsider his decision and told McB to write a resignation letter. McB did so but later wrote to the club telling them that verbally removing his right to appoint the under 19 team without his consent had breached his trust and confidence in his employer leaving him with no alternative but to resign and bring a constructive dismissal claim.

The tribunal dismissed his claim. Their reasons were that the club had always intended that the youth academy director at some point would take over appointing the under 19 team even though McB had not been told this before he resigned. The failure to consult McB was not enough to breach his trust and confidence as this autocratic style of management was the norm in football. Furthermore it was apparent that McB did not mind not being consulted because he did not object to the youth academy director giving him the manager's message rather than the manager himself doing this.

The EAT (Employment Appeal Tribunal) allowed McB's appeal and remitted the case to a fresh tribunal to consider compensation. It was no defence to an allegation of breach of trust and confidence for an employer to say that it and others in the football industry treated employees badly. The obligation of trust and confidence was a mutual one and the club would not have tolerated McB acting in the way his manager had. By imposing the change without prior notice or consultation the club had shown complete disrespect for McB and this was plainly breach of mutual trust and confidence in response to which McB had resigned.

Only in very limited circumstances. Under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE). One of these is where the reason for the variation is not connected to the transfer. This makes it very difficult for the new employer to change the terms of its transferred employees.

Whether a contract change is connected to the transfer is always a question of fact for the tribunal to determine. A recent case where the tribunal found it was not isSmith and ors v Trustees of Brooklands College 2011 IDS Brief 938 EAT. 

S, a teaching and learning assistant (TLA) at a college and other TLAs worked 22-25 hours per week for 43 weeks of the year but were paid salaries as if they were doing a 36 hour week. This was agreed with the college but did not accord with guidance from the relevant union and did not happen anywhere else in the education sector. 

Following a reorganisation, in August 2007 S and other employees transferred to Brooklands College. This was a TUPE transfer. After the transfer, H, the HR director discovered the TLA's salary arrangement and assumed, wrongly, that it was a mistake. H instituted a phased reduction in their pay starting from 1 January 2010. S and the other TLA's initially objected to the reduction but eventually agreed. Their contracts were varied to reflect this.

S and her colleagues then brought tribunal claims for unlawful deductions from pay arguing that although they had properly agreed the variation their agreement and the reduction were void as the sole or principal reason for it was a reason connected with the transfer in August 2007.

The employment judge rejected their claims holding that the reason for the variation was not connected to the transfer; the reason was H's mistaken belief that S and her colleagues were being overpaid in error and this was not in accordance with the practice in the rest of the sector. S and her colleagues appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) but lost. The EAT said that it was open to the employment judge to reach the conclusion he had on the facts and the facts were for him alone to determine.